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REJECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR
LIFE-SHORTENING PALLIATIVE CARE
Donald G. Casswell*
It is possible that a physician who administers life-shortening palliative care,
even to a terminally ill patient with the patient's consent, commits murder.
The Law Reform Commission of Canada, as part of its proposals on recodify-
ing criminal law, has recommended that criminal liability not attach to the
administration of life-shortening palliative care "appropriate in the circum-
stances. " The author submits that while the aim of the Commission's recom-
mendation is good, the phrase "appropriate in the circumstances" should be
replaced with more specific criteria for determining when life-shortening palli-
ative care may be administered. Failure to do so would leave physicians in
almost as uncertain a situation as is presently the case, preventing them from
administering such care without fear of criminal liability.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Victoria, Victoria, British Columbia, Can-
ada. I would like to thank Joan Young and Roberta Reader (both of Third Year Law, Univer-
sity of Victoria, 1989-90) for their research assistance; my colleague, Professor Robert G.
Howell, Dr. Ranald R. Donaldson, physician and surgeon, Victoria, and Dr. Neil MacDonald,
Professor of Palliative Care, Department of Medicine, University of Alberta, for their helpful
comments on various drafts of this article; and Marilynne Seguin, Executive Director, Dying
with Dignity, Dr. David Roy, Center for Bioethics, Clinical Research Institute of Montreal,
and Noreen Teoh, World Health Organization, Geneva, Switzerland, for providing me with
information. Of course, any shortcomings are my responsibility. Parts of this article were
originally presented as a paper at the Third Indo-Pacific Congress on Legal Medicine and
Forensic Sciences, Madras, India, September 1989.
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Vex not his ghost. 0 let him pass! He hates him
That would upon the rack of this tough world
Stretch him out longer.
SHAKESPEARE: King Lear, Act V, Scene iii, Kent speaking.
I. INTRODUCTION
A physician working as a hospital resident is asked to see a 20-year old
woman dying of ovarian cancer. She has not eaten or slept in two days and
is vomiting unrelentlessly. The physician determines that she is suffering
from severe air hunger. She says, "Let's get this over with." The physician
injects the patient with enough morphine "to do the job." Within seconds,
the patient is restful. Within four minutes, she is dead.' Is the physician a
murderer? Maybe.2 Should he be?3 If his primary motive was to relieve the
patient's suffering, most Canadians would say "no." 4
This Article considers the potential criminal liability of a physician who,
with his or her patient's consent, acts to alleviate pain, suffering or other
symptom and thereby shortens the patient's life. After reviewing the present
uncertain state of the law, this Article reviews a recommendation by the
Law Reform Commission of Canada rejecting such criminal liability and
suggests amendments to the proposal.
Defining words used to discuss contentious issues is not easy and writers
sometimes assign markedly different, even completely inconsistent, meanings
** The citations in this article do not necessarily conform to the Harvard Uniform
System of Citation. Some citations follow the author's instructions as to the Canadian form.
1. Based on an actual incident related in It's Over, Debbie, 259 J. A.M.A. 272 (1988),
author's name withheld by request.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 12-58.
3. "He" is used in this sentence and "his" in the next rather than the "he or she" and
"his or her" format used elsewhere in this article since the physician in the case recounted was
male.
4. Law Reform Commission of Canada, REPORT 30: RECODIFYING CRIMINAL LAW
(revised and enlarged edition) 60-61 (1987) [hereinafter REPORT 30]. "[M]ost people, includ-
ing rdligious leaders, see nothing wrong in giving treatment for the purpose of relieving pain in
certain circumstances even though one result of such relief may be to shorten life." Id. In a
recent Gallup poll commissioned by the Toronto Star, 77% of adult Canadians surveyed be-
lieved "that when a person has an incurable disease that causes great suffering, then a doctor
should be allowed by law to end the patient's life through mercy killing, if the person has made
a formal request in writing." Gallup Canada, Inc., Dramatic Increase in Support for Euthana-
sia, CANADIAN DOCTOR 15 (July 24, 1989). In the particular case considered in the text, the
Chief Judge of the Cook County Court, Chicago, ruled that no crime had been proven. See
Smith, All's Well That Ends Well: Towards a Policy of Assisted Rational Suicide or Merely
Enlightened Self-Determination?, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 275, 339 n.459 (1989). The distinc-
tion between relieving suffering and causing death is considered infra at text accompanying
note 6.
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to the same word.5 In this article, "palliative care" refers to any medical
intervention in which the physician's primary purpose is the alleviation of a
patient's pain, suffering or other symptom.6 Palliative care is distinguished
from treatment directed toward a cure or interventions primarily intended to
cause death. Interventions intended primarily to cause death to the patient
are acts of euthanasia ("mercy killing"). In cases where the physician is only
able to alleviate the patient's pain, suffering or other symptom by adminis-
tering treatment which will cause death but intervenes with the primary mo-
tive of alleviating pain, suffering or other symptom rather than causing
death, the physician has administered palliative care rather than committed
an act of euthanasia.7 In particular, while the time between the physician's
intervention and the patient's death is a relevant circumstance in assessing
the physician's motive, it cannot be determinative. For example, even if the
physician's intervention causes the patient's death almost immediately and
he or she foresaw death as a likely consequence of the intervention, an act of
euthanasia has not been committed, provided that his or her motive was
alleviation of the patient's pain, suffering or other symptom. The distinction
5. For example, Smith, supra note 4, at 337 indicates that "euthanasia" has been vari-
ously defined so as to mean both "any good death" and "morally outrageous death" (footnotes
omitted). A typical definition of "euthanasia" is "a deliberate life-shortening act (including
abstaining) by or with the help of someone other than the person concerned and performed in
the patient's interest and in a gentle way." Van der Meer, Euthanasia: A Definition and Ethi-
cal Conditions, 4 J. PALLIATIVE CARE 103 (1988).
6. In this article, it is not necessary to distinguish among "pain," "suffering" and "other
symptom." However, in some situations it may be analytically helpful to distinguish "pain"
and "suffering." See Somerville, Pain and Suffering at Interfaces of Medicine and Law, 36 U.
TORONTO L.J. 286, 287-88 (1986). It is similarly unnecessary in this Article to define pallia-
tive care other than in terms sufficient to distinguish such care from euthanasia. However, it
should be noted that "palliative care" in medical usage normally includes relief of the patient's
emotional, spiritual and social problems as well as pain, suffering or other symptom.
7. This matter requires consideration of the relationship between euthanasia and
pain relief treatment given to terminally ill patients. In both cases there is a desire to
relieve suffering. The difference is that in euthanasia the primary aim is to do this by
inflicting death, whereas in pain relief treatment the primary aim is simply to relieve
pain, not to shorten life or to cause death, although this may be a secondary effect.
One can envisage a continuum that has at one end the giving of pain relief treatment
that will certainly not shorten life, a middle position where there is a possible double
effect flowing - that of relieving pain (which is the primary intention) and that of
possibly shortening life (wich [sic] is not desired) - and at the other end a situation
of a certain double effect because pain relief treatment will necessarily shorten life.
This last case has some of the characteristics of active euthanasia, but it differs from
it in that the desire is not to shorten life. However, motive or desire is not usually
relevant as a differentiating factor to allow criminal liability to be imposed in one
case but not in the other with respect to conduct which is otherwise identical and
which is carried out by a person who has subjective knowledge of the consequences
and risks of that conduct.
Id. at 307.
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is between intended consequences and unintended but foreseeable conse-
quences.' Finally, the expression "pain, suffering or other symptom" refers
collectively to any condition which results in loss of dignity for the patient.
The term "other symptom" includes such conditions as disintegration of
bodily functions, incontinence, continuous saliva flow, extreme fatigue and
shortness of breath, which may result in loss of dignity but which might not
be considered to be "pain" or "suffering."
"Terminal illness" is used to refer to an incurable condition which in rea-
sonable medical opinion will produce death. The sophist might argue that
life itself is an incurable condition which, in reasonable medical opinion and
certain lay knowledge, will produce death. At the other extreme, definitions
of "terminal illness" typically require or seem to require that death be immi-
nent.9 In this Article, the scope of terminal illness is not limited to situations
in which death is imminent or reasonably expected within a predetermined
length of time. An arbitrarily chosen time period, within which death is
expected, should not be given legal significance: the severity of different pa-
tients' suffering is not necessarily different simply because they are expected
to suffer for different periods of time. Further, while "palliative care" is
sometimes associated only with the treatment of terminally ill patients,' °
non-terminally ill patients may also require such care in order to control or
8. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT 77-82 (Washington, D.C. 1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION STUDY].
The difficult question of "intent" in criminal law is considered infra at text accompanying note
37.
9. For example, one definition indicates that "terminal" is "applied to a morbid condi-
tion forming the final stage of a fatal disease." THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 204 (1971) (emphasis added). Similarly, while no Canadian legislation
defines terminal illness, a Private Member's Bill presented to the Ontario Legislature defined
"terminal condition" as "an incurable condition caused by injury or disease by reason of
which, in reasonable medical opinion, death is imminent and only postponed without improve-
ment of the condition during the application of life-sustaining procedures." The Bill was never
enacted. See Dickens, The Right to Natural Death, 26 MCGILL L.J. 847, 873-79 (1981) (em-
phasis added). This definition was based, in part, on California law which defines "terminal
condition" as "an incurable condition caused by injury, disease, or illness, which, regardless of
the application of life-sustaining procedures, would, within reasonable medical judgment, pro-
duce death, and where the application of life-sustaining procedures serve [sic] only to postpone
the moment of death of the patient." CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 7187(f) (West
Supp. 1990). Notably, despite referring to the "moment of death" which perhaps suggests
some requirement df imminency, the statute contains no such explicit requirement.
10. For example, a typical definition of "palliative care" is "the alleviation of pain and
symptoms once cure of the underlying diseases is no longer perceived as possible." PARLIA-
MENT OF VICTORIA, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT COMMITrEE: INQUIRY INTO OPTIONS FOR DY-
ING WITH DIGNITY (SECOND AND FINAL REPORT) 201 (1987) (citing HEALTH DEPARTMENT
VICTORIA, Palliative Care Policy and Program Discussion Paper 7 (Melbourne 1986) [hereinaf-
ter PARLIAMENT OF VICTORIA].
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eliminate pain, suffering or other symptom. Therefore, "palliative care" is
not restricted to the terminally ill.
Four possible situations involving the administration of palliative care,
generated by the principal variables, may be represented schematically as
[life-shortening palliative care, non-life-shortening palliative care] X [termi-
nally ill patient, non-terminally ill patient]."1 Two of these situations are
non-contentious since if palliative care is non-life-shortening, criminal liabil-
ity for murder is irrelevant. Thus, the two situations which must be consid-
ered are administering life-shortening palliative care to a non-terminally ill
patient and administering such care to a terminally ill patient.
II. POSSIBILITY OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR ADMINISTERING LIFE-
SHORTENING PALLIATIVE CARE
In prolonging a patient's life, a physician may also be prolonging pain,
suffering or other symptom. On the other hand, a physician who adminis-
ters life-shortening palliative care by definition shortens the patient's life.
Either course may be characterized as harming the patient and, therefore,
unethical.12 Opinion in the medical profession is divided on whether admin-
istration of life-shortening palliative care is ethical."3 The ethical dilemma
11. In those situations where shortening life is a risk associated with palliative care, that
risk is normally not completely predictable. However, for the purposes of this article, "life-
shortening palliative care" may be defined as including any care which the physician subjec-
tively knows is likely to cause death. See infra text accompanying note 15. Other variables
associated with administering palliative care include whether the patient is competent and the
severity and expected duration of his or her pain, suffering or other symptom. With respect to
the latter, see Somerville, supra note 6, at 299-309. The former is considered infra at text
accompanying notes 77-81.
12. Various versions of the Hippocratic Oath exist, but the following is included in a
representative version: "I will prescribe regimen for the good of my patients according to my
ability and my judgement and never do harm to anyone. To please no one will I prescribe a
deadly drug, nor give advice which may cause his death." DICTIONARY OF MEDICAL ETHICS
210 (A. Duncan, G. Dunstan & R. Welbourn eds. 1981). On the historical underpinnings of
the possibly conflicting goals of alleviation of suffering and prolongation of life, see Smith,
supra note 4, at 343.
13. It is difficult to distinguish viewpoints in the literature dealing with euthanasia and
those dealing with life-shortening palliative care. See supra text accompanying note 6. See
also BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, EUTHANASIA 45-56 (1988) (reviewing the prevailing
medical practices in Europe, Australasia and North America in the context of treatment of the
terminally ill) [hereinafter EUTHANASIA]. Referring to British practice, the Association states:
"Palliative rather than invasive care is the rule for general and surgical management in termi-
nal disease and reflects the intent to opt for comfort and a gentle death rather than the techno-
logical prolongation of life." Id. at 47. The Association goes further: "In contrast to the
tendency in U.K. and European practice, American doctors tend to use all available treat-
ments to prolong life." Id. at 54. This generalization concerning American practice is not
reflected in the conflicting opinions represented in It's Over Debbie, supra note 1, at 272. See
Green, What's Wrong with Trying to Make the Patient Comfortable?, 138 CANADIAN MED.
1990]
132 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 6:127
facing the physician is complicated by the possibility that a physician who
administers life-shortening palliative care commits murder. The Criminal
Code of Canada provides that a person commits homicide when he or she
directly or indirectly causes the death of a human being by any means.14
Murder includes causing the death of a human being by means of an unlaw-
ful act where the person causing death means to cause bodily harm that he
or she knows is likely to cause death and is reckless whether death ensues or
not. 15 Further, no person may consent to have death inflicted on him or her
and consent does not affect the criminal liability of a person who causes
death. 6 Therefore, the patient's consent to the administration of life-short-
ening palliative care would not afford the physician a defence to a charge of
murder.
III. ADMINISTERING LIFE-SHORTENING PALLIATIVE CARE TO A
NON-TERMINALLY ILL PATIENT
A non-terminally ill patient may experience pain, suffering or other symp-
tom which may only be alleviated by life-shortening palliative care. There
appears to be no Canadian or English case which has considered the crimi-
nal liability of a physician who administers life-shortening palliative care to a
non-terminally ill patient and, therefore, no guidance whatsoever as to the
law in such a case.
In the course of a comprehensive consideration of pain and suffering,
Margaret Somerville has suggested that "[a] blanket rule covering all situa-
A.J. 959 (1988); Singer, Should Doctors Kill Patients?, 138 CANADIAN MED. A.J. 1000 (1988);
Pellegrino, Ethics, 261 J. A.M.A. 2843 (1989); Wanzer, Federman, Abelstein, Cassel, Cassem,
Cranford, Hook, Lo, Moertel, Safar, Stone, & Van Eys, The Physician's Responsibility Toward
Hopelessly Ill Patients, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 844 (1989). The article states:
In the patient whose dying process is irreversible, the balance between minimizing
pain and suffering and potentially hastening death should be struck clearly in favor of
pain relief. Narcotics or other pain medications should be given in whatever dose
and by whatever route is necessary for relief. It is morally correct to increase the
dose of narcotics to whatever dose is needed, even though the medication may con-
tribute to the depression of respiration or blood pressure, the dulling of conscious-
ness, or even death, provided the primary goal of the physician is to relieve suffering.
The proper dose of pain medication is the dose that is sufficient to relieve pain and
suffering, even to the point of unconsciousness.
Id. at 847.
14. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 222(1).
15. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 222(5)(a), 229(a)(ii). Only those parts of the
definitions of "culpable homicide" and "murder" directly relevant to the present discussion
have been included.
16. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 14. However, a prior characterization of the
conduct in question as criminal or non-criminal affects the relevance of consent. See Somer-
ville, supra note 6, at 108-09.
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tions is totally inappropriate as it would fail to take due account of different
degrees of pain and suffering occurring in different circumstances, where the
differences should be legally significant."' 7 In particular, "a person at seri-
ous risk of committing suicide because of intractable, chronic, severe pain
should be allowed the option of choosing a pain relief treatment, even if it
may shorten life, if there is no other reasonable alternative to such treat-
ment."" s In other words, the non-terminal nature of the patient's condition
must be balanced against the severity and expected duration of his or her
pain, suffering or other symptom. The important point is that life-shorten-
ing palliative care should not be denied to non-terminally ill patients in all
cases.
Where courts have been required to give directions concerning the future
treatment of children, a test for assessing the severity of pain, suffering or
other symptom has been developed: is the person's life so "demonstrably
awful" that it would be in his or her best interest to be allowed to die?' 9
This test could be used to determine whether the circumstances of a non-
terminally ill patient justify the administration of life-shortening palliative
care.
IV. ADMINISTERING LIFE-SHORTENING PALLIATIVE CARE TO A
TERMINALLY ILL PATIENT
Lord Donaldson, M.R. recently said, "the problem of how to treat the
terminally ill is as old as life itself. Doctors and nurses have to confront it
frequently, but it is never easy.'"20 As old as the ethical and legal problems
associated with treating the terminally ill may be, they have been exacer-
bated by modern medical technology which permits physicians to prolong
life virtually indefinitely.2'
There appears to be no Canadian case and only one English case which
has considered the criminal liability of a physician who administers life-
shortening palliative care to a terminally ill patient.22 One other English
17. See Somerville, supra note 6, at 300-01.
18. Id. at 299-300.
19. See, e.g., In re B. (a Minor), [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1421 (C.A.) at 1424; Re Superintendent
of Family and Child Service and Dawson [1983], 145 D.L.R.(3d) 610 (B.C.S.C.) at 623; In re
C. (a Minor), [1989] 3 W.L.R. 240 (C.A.), considered infra at text accompanying notes 40-51.
20. In re C. (a Minor), [1989] 3 W.L.R. 240 (C.A.) at 242. For a related decision consid-
ering prohibiting the publication of information about the case, see In re C. (a Minor), [1989] 3
W.L.R. 252 (C.A.). This case is considered infra at text accompanying notes 40-51.
21. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
22. It appears that only two American cases have specifically considered the criminal
liability of a physician who administers life-shortening palliative care to a patient. The cases
share a number of similarities. In each, the physician was charged with murdering a patient
1990]
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decision, while not specifically dealing with the criminal liability issue, did
confront the conflict between prolonging life and administering life-shorten-
ing palliative care.
In R. v. Adams,23 the accused physician was tried for the alleged murder
of an eighty-one year old patient, Edith Alice Morrell. Mrs. Morrell was
suffering from cerebral arteriosclerosis and the effects of a stroke. There was
conflicting evidence whether she was experiencing pain and it is not apparent
whether the medical evidence explicitly indicated that she was terminally ill,
although the case seems to have proceeded on the basis that she was.24 The
prosecution's theory was that Dr. Adams, wishing to acquire under Mrs.
Morrell's will an oak chest containing silver and valued at 276 pounds,25
administered drugs26 to her with the intent to kill her. The defence main-
tained that Dr. Adams intended to relieve Mrs. Morrell's pain and that her
illness, not the drugs, caused her death.27
Mr. Justice Devlin charged the jury that the humanitarian motive of a
physician who shortens a patient's life is irrelevant. However, his Lordship
went on to instruct the jury that:
If the first purpose of medicine, the restoration of health, could no
longer be achieved, there was still much for the doctor to do, and
he is entitled to do all that is proper and necessary to relieve pain
and suffering, even if the measures he takes may incidentally
who was dying of cancer, the defence argued that the patient might already have been dead
when the physician acted (in one case injecting the patient with potassium chloride and in the
other giving him air intravenously), and there was expert medical evidence indicating that the
patient might have died of causes other than the physician's act. Both physicians were acquit-
ted. See R. VEATCH, DEATH, DYING, AND THE BIOLOGICAL REVOLUTION: OUR LAST
QUEST FOR RESPONSIBILITY 78-80 (1976); Smith, supra note 4, at 354. Two additional Amer-
ican cases have considered the liability of a physician who administered life-shortening pallia-
tive care to a relative. See B. Sneiderman, J. Irvine & P. Osborne, CANADIAN MEDICAL LAW
238-40 (1989) [hereinafter CANADIAN MEDICAL LAW].
23. Central Criminal Court, London, 1957, unreported, but discussed in Palmer, Dr. Ad-
ams' Trial for Murder, [1957] CRIM. L. REV. 365; G. WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND
THE CRIMINAL LAW 288-90 (1958); Dickens, supra note 9, at 868-70, 872; D. MEYERS,
MEDICO-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEATH AND DYING 127-28 (1981).
24. See excerpts from Mr. Justice Devlin's charge to the jury, infra at text accompanying
notes 28-29, which refer to situations in which "the restoration of health could no longer be
achieved" and "the case of the dying."
25. To put the prosecution's argument concerning motive into perspective, the night nurse
received 300 pounds and the chauffeur 1000 pounds under Mrs. Morrell's will. Palmer, supra
note 23, at 376.
26. Morphine, heroin and paraldehyde. Id. at 365, 369-71.
27. One of the prosecution's expert medical witnesses admitted in cross-examination that
it was impossible to rule out natural causes, such as further cerebral hemorrhage, as the imme-
diate cause of death. Id. at 373.
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shorten life.28
Mr. Justice Devlin stated that in such a situation the patient's illness and not
the administration of palliative care would cause the patient's death. How-
ever, his Lordship added words of caution:
The proper medical treatment that is administered and that has an
incidental effect of determining the exact moment of death, or may
have, is not the cause of death in any sensible use of the term. But
it remains the fact, and it remains the law, that no doctor, nor any
man, no more in the case of the dying than of the healthy, has the
right deliberately to cut the thread of life.2 9
After deliberating for forty-four minutes, the jury found Dr. Adams not
guilty.
30
Since the medical evidence was not certain that the administration of
drugs had in fact been a cause of Mrs. Morrell's death, 31 Mr. Justice Dev-
lin's instruction to the jury on causation was entirely appropriate. It is diffi-
cult, however, to support as a generalized proposition his Lordship's
reasoning that palliative care which has the "incidental effect of determining
the exact moment of death, or may have, is not the cause of death in any
sensible use of the term."' 32 If a factual causal connection between the ad-
ministration of palliative care and the patient's death is proved and if the
physician subjectively knew that the palliative care he or she was about to
administer would likely be life-shortening, it would seem that causation
would be established.3 3 Further, two causes may operate together, with each
legally being a cause of an event.34 In the present context, both the patient's
illness and the physician's administration of life-shortening palliative care
would be causes of the patient's death.
As alternatives to Mr. Justice Devlin's absence of causation analysis, writ-
28. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 289.
29. Id.
30. Dr. Adams was charged with a second count of murder but the prosecution elected
not to proceed. Palmer, supra note 23, at 377.
31. See supra note 27.
32. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 289.
33. With respect to factual causation, note carefully the use of "directly or indirectly" in
the Criminal Code's definition of "homicide." See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
For an act or omission to be a cause of an event it must cause the event in the sense
that the event would not have occurred but for the act or omission. However, two
sufficient causes may operate together, whether independently or comple-
mentarily.... In addition, the conduct in question must be an imputable cause of the
event. Intended consequences are nearly always imputed; the problems relate to un-
intended consequences.
G. WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 400 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter TEXTBOOK OF
CRIMINAL LAW].
34. TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 33, at 400.
1990]
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ers have justified his Lordship's instructions either by reasoning that there
was an absence of intent (the physician did not have the required criminal
intent to murder but rather intended to alleviate suffering)31 or by saying
that the act was justified by necessity.36 However, there are also difficulties
with each of these alternatives. In the case of the former, the finding that a
physician was acting to relieve pain rather than to cause death is relevant to
his or her motive, with the requisite intent nevertheless established if he or
she subjectively apprehended that the palliative care would likely be life-
threatening. 37 While reasoning focused on necessity does require a balanc-
ing of competing values, 38 such reasoning necessarily remains as the mere
explanation of an isolated case and cannot afford clear guidance.
In In re C. (a Minor),39 the English Court of Appeal considered the future
treatment of a terminally-ill 16-week old child. Baby C., who had been born
prematurely, was suffering from congenital hydrocephalus and the effects of
a poorly formed brain structure.' ° She was blind, either deaf or suffering
from very poor hearing, had generalized spasticity in all her limbs, and was
unable to absorb nutrition from food.4 She was described as having become
terminally ill even before her birth and her ultimate prognosis as hopeless.42
As the Master of the Rolls put it, "the sad but fundamental truth [was] that
C. was dying and the only question was how soon this would happen."
4 3
Since C. had been made a ward of the Court for reasons unconnected with
her medical condition, an application was brought for directions concerning
C.'s treatment.44
The Judge at first instance ordered that the continued treatment of C. be
35. D. MEYERS, supra note 23, at 126-27.
36. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 286-88.
37. "Intent" and "motive" are used interchangeably in ordinary speech, making it diffi-
cult to distinguish these terms for legal analysis. Essentially, "intent" refers to a person's
immediate intent to cause something to happen by means of acting or omitting to act whereas
"motive" refers to the person's ultimate intent. ("Intent" is repeated deliberately.) For exam-
ples illustrating attempts at distinguishing "intent" and "motive," see TEXTBOOK OF CRIMI-
NAL LAW, supra note 33, at 75-76. See also supra text accompanying note 6.
38. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 286-87. In order to benefit from the defence of neces-
sity, the accused must have been faced with an urgent situation or imminent peril, there was no
legal alternative and the harm inflicted was less than the harm avoided. See Morgentaler v.
The Queen [1975], 20 C.C.C.(2d) 449 (S.C.C.); Perka v. The Queen [1984], 14 C.C.C.(3d) 385
(S.C.C.); R. v. Morgentaler [1985], 22 C.C.C.(3d) 353 (Ont.C.A.), rev'd in part on other
grounds [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.
39. [1989] 3 W.L.R. 240 (C.A.).
40. Id. at 242.
41. Id. at 245.
42. Id. at 242, 246.
43. Id. at 244.
44. Id. at 242-43.
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in accordance with the opinion expressed by a physician described as "one of
the nation's foremost paediatricians."45 Lord Donaldson, M.R. summarized
the direction of that opinion by saying that it "took the view that the goal
should be to ease the suffering of C. rather than to achieve a short prolonga-
tion of her life." 46 In particular, antibiotics, intravenous infusions and naso-
gastric feedings were to be undertaken only if, in the opinion of the doctors
and nurses treating C., these treatments would reduce her suffering.4 7 Dis-
tinguishing previous decisions4" which had concluded that the lives of seri-
ously handicapped children could not be described as so demonstrably awful
to warrant permitting them to die, the Court of Appeal unanimously agreed
that the Judge's order was in the best interests of C.49 Balcombe, L.J. suc-
cinctly described the Court's order as having the effect of "authoris[ing] the
hospital to withhold life-prolonging treatment for Baby C.." 5°
While Adams and In re C. seem to indicate that under English common
law, and perhaps Canadian law as well, it is not murder for a physician to
administer life-shortening palliative care to a terminally ill patient,5 there is
no certainty in this conclusion. Beyond the difficulties already mentioned,52
legal analyses of intent and causation fail to confront the underlying value
conflicts, 3 leaving the possibility that decisions may be arrived at through
the mechanical application of doctrine.54 While necessity analysis does re-
quire consideration of such values, clear guidance is nevertheless still not
provided.55
In summary, the law provides no clear guidance to physicians concerning
possible criminal liability for administering life-shortening palliative care to
45. Id. at 244.
46. Id. at 245.
47. Id.
48. In re B. (a Minor), [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1421 (C.A.); Re Superintendent of Family and
Child Service and Dawson [1983], 145 D.L.R.(3d) 610 (B.C.S.C.).
49. In re C. (A Minor), [1989] 3 W.L.R. 240 (C.A.).
50. In re C. (a Minor), [1989] 3 W.L.R. 252 (C.A.) at 259.
51. It must be realized that even under the existing law the physician is not required
to treat life as an absolute value .... [W]hen a patient is suffering from a painful
illness the doctor may lawfully administer a narcotic to relieve pain even though he
knows that the drug, used in quantity as it sooner or later has to be, is likely to prove
fatal if not anticipated by the disease. The immediate relief of pain counterbalances
the risk of accelerated death.
G. WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 287-88. See also Dickens, supra note 9, at 868-70, 872; Somer-
ville, supra note 6, at 308 n.56.
52. See supra text accompanying notes 33-38.
53. N. CANTOR, LEGAL FRONTIERS OF DEATH AND DYING 31 (1987) (referring to the
"myths" involved in such analysis).
54. See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 290 (illustrating an example of the pitfalls of
causation analysis).
55. See supra text accompanying note 38.
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a terminally ill patient and no guidance whatsoever in the case of a non-
terminally ill patient.56 A physician who believes that administering life-
shortening palliative care is murder will be prevented from giving such
care.17 The result is that patients requiring and requesting such care may
not receive it. Legislation is required to remove the spectre of criminal lia-
bility looming over physicians who consider administering life-shortening
palliative care.58
V. THE LAW REFORM COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATION
The Law Reform Commission of Canada has recommended that the of-
fences of helping, advising or inciting a person to commit suicide, negligent
homicide, manslaughter and murder, as defined in its proposed new Crimi-
nal Code,59 not be applicable:
[I]n respect of the administration of palliative care that is appropri-
ate in the circumstances to control or eliminate the pain and suffer-
ing of a person regardless of whether or not the palliative care
reduces the life expectancy of that person, unless that person re-
fuses to consent to that care.6°
56. See J. Baudouin, Euthanasia and Cessation of Treatment for Terminally Ill Patients 4
(paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Association of Law Teachers, Van-
couver, June 1983).
57. The other potentially relevant legal liability of the physician is civil liability for failure
to administer palliative care. The possible civil and criminal liabilities are related.
[S]hould failure to provide adequate, reasonably available pain relief treatment con-
stitute medical negligence or malpractice? ... [O]ne cannot create a duty to give pain
relief treatment and impose private law liability in tort for unreasonable failure to
fulfill this and at the same time threaten criminal liability for administering the pain
relief treatment which is required .... [I]f pain relief treatment which may shorten
life were not able to be given without attracting potential criminal liability, it not
only need not or may not, but must not be given. Consequently, the criminal law is
important in establishing the scope of private law duties to provide pain relief
treatment.
Somerville, supra at note 6, at 296-97.
It is submitted that it is highly unlikely that a physician would be held civilly liable in
respect of a failure to administer life-shortening palliative care. In this regard, it is necessary
to distinguish between the patient enjoying the right to request and consent to such care and
being able to demand that a particular physician administer such care. Balancing patient au-
tonomy and professional autonomy is considered infra at text accompanying note 83.
58. It is difficult to imagine that even a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada could be
generally determinative on this matter, since any decision would be dependent upon its partic-
ular facts.
59. REPORT 30, supra note 4, at 185-86.
60. Id. at 186. This statement repeats the Law Reform Commission's previous recom-
mendation of such an amendment. See LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, WORKING
PAPER 28: EUTHANASIA, AIDING SUICIDE AND CESSATION OF TREATMENT 70-71 (1982)
[hereinafter WORKING PAPER 28]; LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, REPORT 20: Eu-
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The essential thrust of this recommendation is to make motive relevant in
certain cases. If the physician's primary motive was the relief of pain and
suffering, no criminal liability attaches even if he or she subjectively knew
that administering palliative care would be life-shortening. On the other
hand, if the primary motive was to cause death, criminal liability would at-
tach. Distinguishing between non-criminal life-shortening palliative care
and criminal euthanasia has been the Commission's consistent position.6'
Two additional points concerning the recommendation should be noted.
First, it is not limited to situations involving terminally ill patients. How-
ever, in commenting on its recommendation, the Commission did note that
"Canadian case-law has no record of conviction of a doctor for shortening a
terminal patient's life by administering pain-relieving drugs."'62 Second, us-
ing the limitation "unless [the patient] refuses to consent to that care' 63 puts
the onus on the prosecution to establish that there was a refusal. That is, the
provision contains a presumption in favour of a patient's desire to receive
life-shortening palliative care in the limited- circumstances encompassed by
it. This presumption is analogous to emergency medical interventions,
where the patient's consent to treatment is assumed in the absence of his or
her refusal. 6'
No legal rule can eliminate the ethical dilemma facing a physician who is
considering administering life-shortening palliative care. 65 A patient, how-
ever, who seeks such care should enjoy access to it. Recognizing such a
right should follow upon acceptance of the principle of self-determination.66
THANASIA, AIDING SUICIDE AND CESSATION OF TREATMENT 22-23 (1983) [hereinafter RE-
PORT 20]; LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, REPORT 28: SOME ASPECTS OF
MEDICAL TREATMENT AND CRIMINAL LAW 8 (1986).
61. WORKING PAPER 28, supra note 60, at 68; REPORT 20, supra note 60, at 17-20; RE-
PORT 28, supra note 60, at 12-13. See also supra text accompanying note 6.
62. REPORT 30, supra note 4, at 60 (emphasis added). However, at least one physician
was charged with first degree murder in such a case. The case was never tried since the physi-
cian left Canada and the Canadian government could not obtain his extradition. See CANA-
DIAN MEDICAL LAW, supra note 22, at 242.
63. REPORT 30, supra note 4, at 186.
64. Marshall v. Curry, [1933] 3 D.L.R. 260, 60 C.C.C. 136 (N.S.S.C.) (action of trespass
did not lie where surgeon, who without the patient's consent, reasonably believed that the
patient's organ should be removed to save that patient's life); Malette v. Shulman [1987], 63
O.R.(2d) 243 (H.C.) (physician held liable when he adminstered blood to Jehovah's witness
carrying a card stating "refusal to consent" to blood transfusions).
65. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
66. In Reibl v. Hughes, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 880 at 890, Laskin, C.J.C., for the Court, quoted
the following statement by Judge Cardozo in Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital,
211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914): "Every human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body .... " Under Canadian
law, attempting to commit suicide is not a crime, although counseling, aiding or abetting an-
other to commit suicide is, whether suicide ensues or not. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-
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Empirical studies indicate that patients frequently do not receive adequate
pain relief despite the availability of analgesic drug therapy. 67 Failure le-
gally to facilitate access to palliative care may force a patient to endure,
against his or her will, "an intrusive and futile battery of medical interven-
tions" 68 involving "cruel and unnecessary practices. ' 69 As the Law Reform
Commission noted, statutorily rejecting criminal liability for the administra-
tion of life-shortening palliative care would clarify the law and bring it "into
line with current moral thinking."' 70 Further, the Commission's recommen-
dation is consistent with recent opinion in other countries.7 ' For these rea-
sons the aim of the Law Reform Commission's recommendation is good.72
However, it is submitted that the recommendation could be improved.
VI. IMPROVING THE LAW REFORM COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATION
The expression "appropriate in the circumstances" is vague and would
leave physicians in almost as uncertain a position as is presently the case. It
should be replaced by criteria which would, first, provide a degree of cer-
tainty sufficient to permit physicians to administer life-shortening palliative
care without fear of criminal liability. Second, the criteria should explicitly
recognize the possibility of lawfully administering such care to both termi-
nally and non-terminally ill patients. In addition, "other symptom" should
be added to "pain" and "suffering" to include conditions which might not be
characterized as "pain" or "suffering." Therefore, it is submitted that the
46, s. 241. For a comprehensive consideration of the position of someone who assists another
to commit suicide, see Smith, supra note 4.
67. Shapiro, The Right of Privacy and Heroin Use for Painkilling Purposes by the Termi-
nally Ill Cancer Patient, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 41, 42 (1980); Angell, The Quality of Mercy, 306
NEW ENG. J. MED. 98 (1982); WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, CANCER PAIN RELIEF 7-8
(1986).
68. EUTHANASIA, supra note 13, at 55.
69. Id.
70. REPORT 30, supra note 4, at 61.
71. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION STUDY, supra note 8, at 77-82; PARLIAMENT OF VIC-
TORIA, supra note 10, at 217-18, 220-21, 224; Roy, Ethical Issues in the Treatment of Cancer
Patients, 67 BULLETIN OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 341 (1989). The article by
Roy refers to accepted acts of euthanasia in the Netherlands and Japan. Id. at 343-44. It also
addresses the recommendation of the World Health Organization's Ethics Working Group:
"Since patients have a right to receive, and health care professionals have a duty to provide,
adequate relief of pain, countries should review their laws to eliminate legal impediments to
the achievement of adequate pain relief." Id. at 346.
72. One author expresses the opinion that "its implementation would probably have a
positive impact on medical practice, eliminate continuation of useless medical treatment, pro-
mote the responsibility of the medical profession and the development of palliative care."
Baudouin, supra note 56, at 27.
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Law Reform Commission's recommendation should be amended to provide
that criminal liability is not incurred:
[I]n respect of the administration of palliative care to control or
eliminate the pain, suffering or other symptom of a person regard-
less of whether or not the palliative care reduces the life expectancy
of that person, if in the opinion of a medical practitioner
(a) that person is terminally ill, or
(b) that person's life is demonstrably awful because of pain, suf-
fering, or other symptom, unless that person refuses to consent to
that care.
Reliance upon the opinion of a medical practitioner is drawn from the
example of other legislation73 and "demonstrably awful life" is derived from
precedent.74 The latter presents a very difficult standard to apply. In the
present context, however, it is intended to refer to those situations in which a
physician agrees with the patient that the quality of his or her life is so unac-
ceptable as to warrant the administration of life-shortening palliative care
even though he or she is not terminally ill. In assessing a patient's circum-
stances, factors to be considered include (1) the nature and severity of the
patient's pain, suffering or other symptom; (2) whether the patient is senti-
ent, capable of experiencing relationships with others " and able to maintain
personal dignity; and (3) how well the patient is able to bear his or her pain,
suffering or other symptom and, in particular, whether he or she is at risk of
attempting suicide. It must be emphasized that the physician would not be
imposing his or her assessment of the patient's life against the patient's will:
the presupposition throughout is that the patient consents to, and indeed
probably initiates a request for, palliative care even though such care will be
life-shortening.
Further, "palliative care" and "terminally ill" should be defined. A prob-
ably non-contentious definition of "palliative care" would be "any medical
intervention in which the physician's primary motive is the alleviation of
pain, suffering or other symptom rather than attaining a cure." Defining
73. Such legislation may deal with matters of competence. See, e.g., The (British Colum-
bia) Infants Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 196, s. 16; The (British Columbia) Mental Health Act,
R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 256, s. 20. Other legislation deals with the ability to engage in an activity
such as driving a motor vehicle. See, e.g., The (British Columbia) Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C.
1979, c. 288, s. 221. Most recently, Bill C-43, An Act respecting abortion, 2nd Session, 34th
Parliament, Nov. 3, 1989, specifically employs the criterion of "a medical practitioner who is
of the opinion . . .".
74. For example, In re B. (a Minor), [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1421 (C.A.) at 1424; Re Superinten-
dent of Family and Child Service and Dawson (1983), 145 D.L.R.(3d) 610 (B.C.S.C.) at 623;
In re C. (a Minor), considered supra at text accompanying notes 39-50.
75. For example, in In re C. (a Minor), considered supra at text accompanying notes 39-
50, the medical evidence suggested that Baby C. likely was unable to "experience very much."
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"terminally ill" is contentious. As indicated, "terminal illness" is often asso-
ciated with imminent death.76 It is submitted that such a limitation should
not be included. Rather, "terminally ill" should be defined as "suffering
from an incurable condition which in reasonable medical opinion will pro-
duce death." While these definitions provide some structure, hopefully they
remain flexible enough to permit a situational analysis of individual patients'
circumstances.7
VII. LIFE-SHORTENING PALLIATIVE CARE, PATIENT AUTONOMY
AND PROFESSIONAL AUTONOMY: THE NEED FOR A
TOLERANT LAW
A. The Requirement of Patient Consent
Life-shortening palliative care would only be recognized as lawful if ad-
ministered with the patient's consent. 7' The law of informed consent is ap-
plicable to administering life-shortening palliative care in the same way as to
any other medical intervention. If the patient is a competent adult, the pa-
tient may consent to or refuse the administration of life-shortening palliative
care. 7  In the case of an incompetent adult patient, the principle of self-
determination should be respected by first asking whether the wishes of the
patient, expressed at a time when he or she was competent, are known.80 In
the case of a child, the child may be competent to decide for himself or
herself whether to consent to life-shortening palliative care. 1 If not, the
child's parent or legal guardian will be able to give or withhold consent on
the child's behalf, subject to the constraint that if the parent or guardian is
not acting in the child's best interest, the court will be able to substitute its
76. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
77. The Law Reform Commission did not define "palliative care" and did not use "termi-
nal illness." Ensuring flexibility is essential. "Each clinical case, particularly those invplving
life-death decisions .... [raises] the one governing question of the moment: how can we help
this person live or die in a fashion that honours his or her dignity and ours as well?" Roy,
Ethics in Palliative Care, 3 J. PALLIATIVE CARE 3, 5 (1987).
78. See supra text accompanying note 63.
79. Reibl v. Hughes, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 880.
80. Several American cases have considered this type of situation, the principal context
having been the incompetent patient's right to have treatment discontinued. See Annas, Rec-
onciling Quinlan and Saikewicz: Decision Making for the Terminally Ill Incompetent, in E.
DOUDERA, LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF TREATING CRITICALLY AND TERMINALLY
ILL PATIENT 28-62 (1982); Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARV. L. REV. 375
(1988); Smith, supra note 4, at 384-408.
81. If the child has the ability to understand the proposed medical intervention, he or she
is competent at common law. Johnston v. Wellesley Hospital [1970], 17 D.L.R.(3d) 139
(Ont.H.C.); Re L.D.K.; C.A.S. Metro Toronto v. K. [1985], 48 R.F.L.(2d) 164 (Ont.Prov.Ct.).
Alternatively, the child may be competent by statute. See, e.g., The (British Columbia) Infants
Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 196, s. 16.
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judgment.8 2 In short, as Lord Donaldson, M.R. said in a slightly different
context, "no new principle is involved"" a with respect to the informed con-
sent aspect of administering life-shortening palliative care.
B. Reconciling Patient Autonomy and Professional Autonomy
By rejecting the possibility that a physician may be criminally liable for
administering life-shortening palliative care, Canadian law would take a
large step towards recognizing that a patient enjoys a right not to suffer.
Certainly, rejection of criminal liability for administering life-shortening pal-
liative care would allow decisions about such care to be made by individual
patients, according to their personal beliefs, in consultation with their loved
ones and physicians.
The question remaining is whether a patient may require a particular phy-
sician to administer life-shortening palliative care. The Commission's pro-
posal does not encompass this question, and rightly so. If a patient were able
to require a particular physician to administer life-shortening palliative care,
he or she would be able to force his or her moral opinion upon a physician
who might not share that opinion. This outcome would be as objectionable
as denying life-shortening palliative care to a patient who wishes it on the
grounds that someone else found such care morally unacceptable. The pa-
tient who wishes life-shortening palliative care may seek treatment by a phy-
sician who does not find such care morally offensive. A tolerant law which
permits, but does not require, the administration of life-shortening palliative
care balances patient autonomy and professional autonomy, and respects dif-
ferent ethical, moral, and professional opinions.84
VIII. CONCLUSION
The thrust of the Law Reform Commission's recommendation rejecting
82. Either pursuant to the court's common law parens patriae jurisdiction or, more typi-
cally, under child welfare legislation. See, e.g., The (British Columbia) Family and Child Ser-
vice Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 119.1, s. 10(l)(b); Re Superintendent of Family and Child Service
and Dawson [1983], 145 D.L.R.(3d) 610 (B.C.S.C.).
83. In re C (a Minor), [1989] 3 W.L.R. 240 (C.A.) at 249.
84. Patient autonomy is a crucial aspect of informed patient care. This is achieved
most successfully where a trusting and open relationship between the doctor and the
patient allows participation in decisions about illness and its treatment. Doctors
should regard patients as authorising treatment, and should respect those authorisa-
tions and any decision to withdraw consent. But autonomy works both ways. Pa-
tients have the right to decline treatment but do not have the right to demand
treatment which the doctor cannot, in conscience, provide.
EUTHANASIA, supra note 13, at 67. See also N. CANTOR, supra note 53, at 5; Smith, supra
note 4, at 359-60.
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criminal liability for administering life-shortening palliative care is good.
However, it does not explicitly recognize the possibility that non-terminally
ill patients may require such care nor would it provide adequate guidance to
physicians as to when such care may lawfully be administered, either to ter-
minally or non-terminally ill patients. This Article suggests that the Com-
mission's recommendation be amended along the lines proposed. Otherwise,
patients may still be denied the right to choose not to suffer because of physi-
cians' uncertainty as to the lawfulness of administering life-shortening pallia-
tive care.
It is not unreasonable to suppose that most of us hope to die peacefully
and with dignity."5 Rejecting the possibility of criminal liability for adminis-
tering life-shortening palliative care would increase the chances that we will
enjoy the option of death with dignity. 6
85. In a poll of 509 lawyers, 49% believed that the physician referred to in the situation
considered in It's Over Debbie, supra note 1 and accompanying text, should be prosecuted
criminally, whereas 34% thought not. Interestingly, however, 56.8% of the same group an-
swered "yes" to the question "Should active euthanasia - the administration of a lethal injec-
tion to a terminally ill patient who wants to die - be legal?" and 51.3% indicated that they
would ask their physician for relief similar to that given to "Debbie" if they were "hopelessly
ill and in great pain." See Reidinger, Lawpoll: Should Active Euthanasia Be Legal?, 74 A.B.A.
J. 20 (June 1988). As indicated, the poll's questions were expressed in terms of active euthana-
sia rather than life-shortening palliative care. Quaere whether more respondents would have
approved of the same acts if they had been characterized as life-shortening palliative care
rather than as active euthanasia? See supra text accompanying note 6.
86. "There is no necessity that any person die in misery, deprived of human dignity." G.
GRISEZ & J. BOYLE, LIFE AND DEATH WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE 183 (1979).
